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ADOPTIVE PARENT VERSUS
NATURAL PARENT: SEVERING
THE GORDIAN KNOT OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDERS*
And so they wrangled before the king. "This one says," the king
observed. "My son is the one who is alive; your son is dead," while
the other says, "that is not true! Your son is the dead one, mine is
the live one." "Bring me a sword" said the king; and a sword was
brought into the king's presence. "Cut the living child in two," the
king said "and give half to one, half to the other." At this the
woman who was the mother of the living child addressed the king,
for she burned with pity for her son. "If it please you, my lord"
she said "let them give her the child; only do not let them think of
killing it!" But the other said, "He shall belong to neither of us. Cut
him up." Then the king gave his decision. "Give the child to the
first woman," he said, "and do not kill him. She is his mother."
All Israel came to hear of the judgement the king had pronounced,
and held the king in awe, recognizing that he possessed divine wis-
dom for dispensing justice.'
Although the legal process of adoption was never recognized by the
common law, 2 the Court of Equity in England, exercising the king's
* This article is a student work prepared by Joseph P. Forte, a member of the
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW and the St. Thomas More Institute for Legal Research.
1 1 Kings 3:23-28 (The Jerusalem Bible).
2 See In re Thorne, 155 N.Y. 140, 143, 49 N.E. 661, 662 (1898).
Although in the nations of continental Europe that adopted the Roman legal
system, the Roman process of adoption was maintained, adoption was strictly a
statutory creature in countries with a common-law tradition. H. CLARKE, THE
LAw OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 602-03 (1968) [hereinafter
CLARK]; In re Thorne, supra. It was not until 1851 that Massachusetts became the
first common-law jurisdiction to recognize adoption by statute. See Ross v. Ross,
129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880). Prior to this legislation, children in certain instances
were transferred as a chattel was transferred. This was done without any legal
proceeding, although it sometimes had the sanction of law. CLARK 603. New York
did not enact an adoption statute until 1873. An Act to Legalize the Adoption of
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prerogative as parens patriae had the power
to protect children and to act for their wel-
fare and in their best interests. 3 Within the
scope of this power was the discretion to
Minor Children by Adult Persons, LAWS OF NEW
YORK ch. 830 (1873). However, before this
legislation, several charitable societies were per-
mitted under their charters (granted by the
legislature) to place children for adoption. In re
Thorne, 155 N.Y. at 144, 49 N.E. at 663. In
fact, the birthplace of the common law-Eng-
land-did not recognize adoption by legislative
enactment until 1926. For a detailed account of
the history of adoption law, see Huard, The Law
of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743 (1956).
While this article does not deal with adoption
per se, a definition of the relationship will pro-
vide a clearer perspective from which to view
the issues raised herein:
Adoption is the legal process by which a child
acquires parents other than his natural parents
and parents acquire a child other than a
natural child. As a result of the adoption
decree the legal rights and obligations which
formerly existed between the child and his
natural parents come to an end, and are re-
placed by similar rights and obligations with
respect to his new adoptive parents.
CLARK 602.
See generally M. LEVY, LAW OF ADOPTION
(1968) (provides a general survey of adoption
law in the United States).
3 See In re Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 938 (ch.
1847) (The court held that jurisdiction over the
custody of a child was not solely limited to cases
involving the child's property). Eyre v. Shaftes-
bury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722) (holding the
Crown "the supreme guardian and superintendant
of all infants"); Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep.
814 (Ch. 1696) (special delegation of crown's
power-parens patriae-to the court).
For a more recent American case, see Finlay
v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925),
in which Judge Cardozo stated:
He [the chancellor] acts as parens patriae to
do what is best for the interest of the child.
He is to put himself in the position of a
'wise, affectionate and careful parent'.
Id. at 433, 148 N.E. at 626.
exercise a supervisory scrutiny or even
possibly control over children's custody.4
Primarily, the right to custody and control
of a child resides in the natural parent.5
However, the parental right to custody of
the child is not an absolute or an inalien-
able right.6 Hence, the state acting as
parens patriae is able, in certain limited
circumstances, in the best interests of the
child, to restrict or even terminate by vari-
4 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624
(1925); In re Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937 (Ch.
1847) [Court acknowledged its right to interfere
to protect a child]; Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 24 Eng.
Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722).
Compare the powers of the equity court acting
as parens patriae in custody cases to the power
exercised by the Hebrew King Solomon. 1 Kings
3:16-28. Although his method may have been
unduly harsh, he succeeded in uncovering the
true mother of the living child or at least the
one with the child's own interest at heart. See
generally People ex rel. Beaudoin v. Beaudoin,
126 App. Div. 505, 110 N.Y.S. 592 (3d Dep't),
afl'd, 193 N.Y. 611, 86 N.E. 1129 (1908).
5 Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d
236 (1942).
Parental rights today generally include: con-
trol, custody, natural guardianship, determina-
tion of living standards, of religion, of educa-
tion, earnings, inheritance and the right to
notice and appearance at judicial proceedings
involving their children. . . . Coupled with
rights are parental responsibilities for care,
support, guidance and supervision.
Gordon, Terminal Placements of Children and
Permanent Termination of Parental Rights: The
New York Permanent Neglect Statute, 46 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 215 n.1 (1971) [hereinafter
Gordon].
There are several theories which attempt to
explain the basis of these parental rights. See id.
for a discussion of several of the theories ad-
vanced and the relevant authorities. See also In
re Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 7, 135 N.Y.S.
328, 332 (2d Dep't 1942); Guardianship of
Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954).
6 Gordon at 215 n.1.
ous judicial proceedings 7 the relationship
which exists between the parent and the
child.8 These situations may be character-
ized as involuntary terminations of cus-
tody.9 Conversely, it is within the legal
For example, as a result of a divorce order or
a neglect proceeding, a court may limit or
terminate--either temporarily or permanently-
the parental right to custody.
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court
under its equity powers may in a proper case,
having regard for the welfare of an infant,
take its custody from the one legally entitled
thereto and give it to another; ....
People ex rel. Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 126 App.
Div. 505, 507, 110 N.Y.S. 592, 593 (3d Dep't),
a0U'd mem., 193 N.Y. 611, 86 N.E. 1129 (1908).
This article is primarily concerned with volun-
tary surrenders of custody; for a detailed and
scholarly exposition of involuntary termination
of parental custody, see Gordon. Although Gor-
don centers on the New York permanent neglect
statute, his coverage of involuntary termination
in general is most interesting. See, e.g., N.Y.
SOC. SERVICES LAW § 392 (McKinney Supp.
1970) (limit on temporary custody transfer).
8 Thus, where the custody in controversy resides
in the natural parent, the mere fact of parent-
age carries a presumptive strength which can
be overcome only by a powerful showing that
the interests of the child require that custody
be wrested away.
People v. Free Synagogue Child Adoption
Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 337, 85 N.Y.S.2d 541,
545 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
9 While a parent's consent is usually necessary
for foster care or adoption, there are extraordi-
nary statutorily defined exceptions under which
the consent of the parent may be dispensed with.
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 384(5)
(McKinney Supp. 1970); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 111 (McKinney Supp. 1970); see generally
Gordon. However, the extent of this power is
very limited.
No court can, for any but the gravest reasons,
transfer a child from its natural parent to any
other person, . . . [citations omitted] . ...
since the right of a parent, under natural law,
to establish a home and bring up children is a
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competence of a natural parent to volun-
tarily surrender his right to the custody and
control of his childL-either temporarily
fundamental one and beyond the reach of any
court, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 . ..
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539,
542, 104 N.E.2d 895, 896 (1952).
10 Early statutory schemes for the transfer of
the custody of children proceeded much as the
transfer of chattels and without judicial super-
vision. CLARK 603.
In early England, a father could sell into
slavery a son under seven years of age. 2 F. POL-
LOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 436 (2d ed. 1968). However, there is a
basic conflict among the authorities as to whether
or not a parent can transfer the legal custody of
a child to another. While some jurisdictions
held that in the absence of a statute any attempt
to permanently transfer custody was invalid as
against public policy, e.g., Stickles v. Reichardt,
203 Wis. 579, 234 N.W. 728 (1931), other
jurisdictions have held that such a transfer is
valid, e.g., Enders v. Enders, 164 Pa. 266, 30
A.2d 129 (1894). For further treatment of this
question, see 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 11(d)
(1950).
The New York Court of Appeals has observed:
A father unable to provide for his infant child,
may transfer the custody, control and the right
to the services thereof to another, subject to
the right of a court of equity to interfere in
the interest of the child. The mutual promises,
therefore, of the parties to the instrument
before us furnished an adequate consideration
to support it.
Middleworth v. Ordway, 191 N.Y. 404, 411, 84
N.E. 291, 293 (1908). See In re Donnelly, 70
Misc. 584, 129 N.Y.S. 120 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1911) (court adhered to the rule in
Middleworth but interfered for the interest of
the child and returned custody to the mother);
cf. In re Thorne, 155 N.Y. 140, 49 N.E. 661
(1898) (Court recognized the existence of
private agreements of custody transfer without
the sanction of law, but refused to give the
indenture the authority which it purported to
exercise as an adoption). Some states, however,
require judicial supervision and consent to all
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or permanently-to an individual or an
surrenders. In re David, 256 A.2d 583 (Me.
1969).
Since all American jurisdictions now recognize
adoption by statute, as a matter of course they
take cognizance of voluntary surrenders.
In New York, this parental power to surrender
custody is recognized in the Social Services Law.
1. Method. The guardianship of the person
and the custody of a . . . dependent child
may be committed to an authorized agency
either by an order of the surrogate or judge
of the family court . . . or by a written
instrument which shall be known as a
surrender, and signed:
(a) if both parents shall then be living,
by the parents of such child, or by the
surviving parent, if either parent of such
child be dead;
(c) . . . or if such child is born out of
Wedlock, by the mother of such child;
2. Terms. Such guardianship shall be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this article
and the instrument shall be upon such
terms; for such time and subject to such
condition as may be agreed upon by the
parties thereto. If one of the purposes of
such surrender is the adoption of such
child from such authorized agency the
instrument shall make specific provision
therefor and it may recite that the autho-
rized agency is thereby authorized and
empowered to consent to the adoption of
such child in the place and stead of the
person signing the instrument, and that
the person signing the instrument waives
any notice of such adoption; it may also
provide for the absolute surrender of such
child to such authorized agency ...
3. [Describes the nature and form of the
surrender instrument].
N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW § 384(1),(2),(3)
(McKinney 1966).
4. Upon petition by an authorized agency, a
surrogate or judge of the family court may
approve such surrender, on notice to such
person as the surrogate or judge may in
his discretion prescribe. No person who has
received such notice and been afforded an
opportunity to be heard may challenge the
validity of a surrender approved pursuant
agency" willing to accept custody and able
to this subdivision in any other proceeding.
However, this subdivision shall not be
deemed to require the approval of a sur-
render by a surrogate or judge for such
surrender to be valid.
N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW § 384(4) (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
Although this statute only takes cognizance of
surrenders made to authorized agencies, a parent
can surrender his child to an individual for
adoption. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 115-16
(McKinney Supp. 1970); People ex rel. Anony-
mous v. Rebecca Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y,
271 App. Div. 672, 68 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2d
Dep't 1947).
This concept of surrender to an individual in
view of adoption is impliedly acknowledged by
the requirement of a six-month residence with
the adoptive parent prior to an order of adop-
tion. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 112(6), 116(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1970). See In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 143 N.Y.S.2d
90 (2d Dep't 1955).
11 Since 1961 New York has distinguished be-
tween private placements and authorized agency
placements for adoption by dividing the proce-
dure into two separate titles. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 112-14 (McKinney Supp. 1970) (Adop-
tion from Authorized Agency). Id. §§ 115-16.
(Private Placement Adoption).
Furthermore, section 111 of the New York Do-
mestic Relations Law (McKinney Supp. 1970),
which enumerates the consent necessary for an
adoption, provides that
[t]he consent shall not be required of a parent
• . . who has surrendered the child to an au-
thorized agency for the purpose of adoption
under the provisions of the social services law.
In other words, a parent who surrenders his
child to an agency to be placed for adoption is
in effect executing a carte blanche consent to
future adoption (qualified by the agency's right
to consent). On the other hand, in the case of a
surrender to an individual for adoption, the
natural parents' consent is still required for adop-
tion. People ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca Tal-
bot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, 271 App. Div. 672,
68 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2d Dep't 1947).
Thus, in comparison with other jurisdictions, a
to care for the child.12 This action could be
termed a voluntary termination of the
parental right to custody. However, the
scope of this article will be limited to a
consideration and analysis of a parent's
power to revoke or withdraw-prior to a
final decree of adoption"'-his voluntary
permanent surrender of custody of the child
(with a view to adoption) and the con-
comitant problems. The core problem is
whether a parent has such a power of
consent revocation and if he does, to what
extent it may be exercised in defeating a
prospective adoption.
In their considerations of the existence
and the extent of this power of revocation,
the courts and legislatures of various juris-
dictions have formulated several disparate
approaches. However, from the resulting
potpourri of cases and statutes dealing with
New York surrender to an agency for the pur-
pose of adoption can be considered as a consent
to an adoption. But see note 42 infra.
12 The obligations of parenthood and the law
limit this power to surrender the custody rights
of the child. The parent must either provide for
the child himself or otherwise have another as-
sume the duties and responsibilities of custody.
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 384 (McKin-
ney 1966). Otherwise, if the parent simply at-
tempts to avoid his obligations, the child would
be considered neglected or abandoned. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 371(2) (McKinney
Supp. 1970); Id. § 371(4) (McKinney 1966). If
the child is neglected or abandoned, the state may
commit the child to an authorized agency without
the defaulting parent's consent in effect an in-
voluntary termination of custody. See, e.g., N.Y.
Soc. SERVICES LAW § 384(5) (McKinney Supp.
1970). See generally Gordon.
13 For discussion of parental attacks upon final
decrees of adoption, see Note, Attacks on Adop-
tion Decrees by Natural Parents to Regain Cus-
tody, 61 YALE L.J. 591 (1952).
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the subject, three distinct rules emerge. 14
Although none of the three approaches
deny the existence of a possible parental
power of revocation, they do differ as to
the extent of its effectiveness as a legal
consequence of its exercise in a given
situation.1 5 In order to appreciate the pre-
cise distinctions, an examination of the
approaches as applied is necessary.
Historically, the first approach which the
courts adopted in the absence of a statu-
tory norm was the rule of absolute revoca-
bility (as a matter of right)*16 Within the
scope of this approach, a parent who had
consented to an adoption 7 was considered
to have as a matter of right an absolute
power-at any time prior to the final decree
of adoption-to revoke his consent to that
adoption.1 8 In the exercise of this power,
the parent was not required to establish any
legal reason for the revocation.1 9 As the
14 Comment, Revocation of Parental Consent to
Adoption: Legal Doctrine and Social Policy, 28
U. CHI. L. REV. 564 (1961) [hereinafter Legal
Doctrine]. [This comment provided an exhaustive
survey of the cases and statutes which concern
the parental right of revocation].
15 Although states generally fall into one cate-
gory or another, an important consideration will
often be to whom is the parent surrendering the
child-an individual or an authorized agency.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca
Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, 271 App. Div.
672, 68 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2d Dep't 1947). The
difference can sometimes be crucial to the out-
come of the case.
16 CLARK 627.
17 For future discussion, the concept of consent
to adoption will include surrenders of custody
with a view toward adoption. See note 11 supra.
Is For a compilation of the authorities which
espouse this rule, see Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1038
(1942).
19 See, e.g., In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich.
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Michigan Supreme Court observed in In re
White's Adoption,"' "In]either the lack of
proof of fraud or undue influence nor the
respective advantages in favor of or against
adoption is controlling of the result."'21
A critical evaluation of this language
would disclose that the court in following
this rule did not perceive this power as a
privilege to be exercised only within the
grant of its discretion. Rather, it appears
that the power was regarded as an absolute
right appurtenant to parenthood. Thus, it
was capable of being exercised arbitrarily
at the will of the parent with the courts
merely mechanically acknowledging the
revocation as a fait accompli.
The legal justification for this rule was
expressed in terms of a highly technical
jurisdictional distinction that
parental consent being necessary to an
adoption, withdrawal of such consent be-
fore the final decree had "vested" any right
to the child in the adoptive parents deprived
the court of jurisdiction to decree the adop-
tion. 22
378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942); In re Nelms, 153
Wash. 242, 279 P. 748 (1929) [viewing the con-
sent as a valid contract which could be revoked
by the natural parent and recognizing that such
parent might have to answer for the breach of
contract with damages]. But see People ex rel.
Anonymous v. Saratoga County Dep't of Public
Welfare, 30 App. Div. 2d 756, 291 N.Y.S.2d 526
(3d Dep't 1968) (considered surrender a contract
under court supervision).
20 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942).
21 Id. at 384, 1 N.W.2d at 581.
22 Katz, Judicial and Statutory Trends in the
Law of Adoption, 51 GEO. L.J. 64, 89 (1962)
[hereinafter Katz] [footnotes omitted].
The Michigan Supreme Court utilized similar
language.
Therefore, while the consent operates to
confer jurisdiction upon the court for the
adoption proceeding, until the decree there
has been no alteration whatsoever in the
parent's "vested" right to the child. The
relationship could be terminated and the
vested rights transferred only through the
vehicle of the final decree of adoption
issued by the court. Although the term
"vested" engenders conceptions of prop-
erty rights, 23 the primitive notion of a child
as constituting the property of the parent
has been repeatedly condemned by the
courts. 24 For example, in answer to a
It is our opinion that under the circumstances
of this case, no vested rights having intervened,
the natural mother had the right to withdraw
her consent to the adoption during the 90 days
while the probate court still had control over
the matter by a rehearing.
In re White's Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 384, 1
N.W.2d 579, 581 (1942) [allowing revocation
until the rehearing date expires after final decree].
Contra, Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d
388 (1952) (parent cannot deprive court of juris-
diction by withdrawing consent).
"Vested Rights" have been defined as
[r]ights which have so completely and definitely
accrued to or settled in a person that they are
not subject to be defeated or canceled by the
act of any other private person, and which it
is right and equitable that the government
should recognize and protect being lawful in
themselves and settled according to the then
current rules of law, and of which the indi-
vidual could not be deprived arbitrarily without
injustice, or of which he could not justly be
deprived otherwise than by the established
methods of procedure and for the public wel-
fare.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1735 (4th ed. 1957).
2. "Vested" is defined as "[h]aving the char-
acter or giving the rights of absolute ownership."
Id. at 1734 (4th ed. 1957).
24 While the right of the natural parents to the
custody of their children is not a proprietary
mother's claim of the unqualilicd right to
revoke her consent to her child's adoption,
a New York court retorted that
[n]either the natural mother nor the foster
parents have any rights in the foster child,
which are in any way similar to property
rights, which the courts would be required
to enforce.25
However, it cannot be denied that courts
recognizing an absolute right of revocation
are, in fact, emphasizing the parent's rights
above all other considerations. 26 In the con-
text of any attempted consent revocation
there are several interests that are involved
-the interest of the child, the adoptive
parents, the natural parents and society.
Yet, when confronted with these diverse
right in the same sense as if the child were a
chattel, and while it is accompanied by a cor-
responding duty which arises from the relation
of parent and child, it has ever been regarded,
even in primitive civilization, as one of the
highest natural rights.
In re Livingston, 151 App. Div. 1, 7, 135 N.Y.S.
328, 332 (2d Dep't 1912).
25 In re Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161, 165,
143 N.Y.S.2d 90, 94 (2d Dep't 1955).
It is noteworthy that the language employed ad-
monishes that if it were a property right, the
court would be bound to enforce it. This notion
is inconsistent with the rejection of the concept
of a property right by courts espousing the abso-
lute right to revocation rule.
Another New York court rejected the concept
in even stronger terms:
A child is not a chattel to be bought or sold,
directly or indirectly, and may not be delivered
as if it were either an animate or inanimate
gift.
People ex rel. Gill v. Lapidus, 202 Misc. 1116,
1118, 120 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1953); In re Livingston, 151 App. Div.
1, 7, 135 N.Y.S. 328, 332 (2d Dep't 1912).
26 See, e.g., Green v. Paul, 212 La. 337, 31 So.
2d 819 (1947).
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interests and interrelationships, these courts
automatically react by invoking the para-
mount right of the parent to custody as
controlling, not considering that it might
be in derogation of the child's best interests.
By their deference to this "vested" right,
these courts have ignored the long recog-
nized power of equity courts to interfere in
the best interests of the child.27 By this rule,
they allow the biological predicate to pre-
vail over even the most intense of human
relationships which may develop 2 8-upon
which the psychological as well as physical
well-being of the child may depend. It has
been observed that
[t]he mutual interaction between adult and
child, which might be described in such
terms as love, affection, basic trust, and
confidence, is considered essential for a
successful development, and is the basis of
what may be termed psychological parent-
hood . . . rather than the biological events
which may precipitate such a relationship
which many psychologists identify as the
sine qua non of successful personality de-
velopment.2
9
27 See note 3 supra.
28 In most jurisdictions, after the requisite con-
sent has been given the child is physically trans-
ferred to the prospective new home. The pros-
pective adoptive child and adoptive parents are
given the opportunity to adjust to one another
and to interrelate before the adoption is finalized.
The length of time of this required residence
varies. In New York, the child must reside in the
prospective home six months before a decree of
adoption will be issued. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 112(6) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
29 Note, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,
73 YALE L.J. 151, 158 (1963); for discussion of
the psychological effects of revocation, see Com-
ment, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Two Inter-
pretations of a Child's Best Interests, Appendix 1,
11 J. FAM. L. 305 (1971).
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Thus, in the situation where the child re-
sides, either pursuant to statute30 or private
agreement, with the prospective adopting
parents prior to the adoption, strong psy-
chological bonds tend to emerge. Yet under
the rule of absolute revocability, regardless
of these developments in the child's life,
the court will be constrained to capitulate
to the parent's revocation as a matter of
law. The possible psychological repercus-
sions upon the child, potentially serious, are
totally disregarded by the courts in their
quest for the mechanical application of this
rule. The dangers have been recognized by
some courts. The New York Court of Ap-
peals has observed:
While the circumstances of a particular
case must be strong in order to overcome
the so-called paramount right of the parent,
yet where the circumstances of a particular
case contains such evidence, the best inter-
ests of the infants must be the guiding
principle. The surroundings and associa-
tions of the young have so great an affect
upon their outlook and so form the basis
of their future development that nothing
should prevent the courts from considering
the human aspects of the question. 31
Thus, in spite of an endless variety of
possible situations in which the child might
be, the rule will be blindly applied to all
circumstances in like manner in contradic-
tion to all the methods recognized by mod-
ern psychology. The only bar is a final
court decree of adoption. At this juncture,
it should be borne in mind that these ap-
proaches only apply to situations in which
30 See note 28 supra.
31 In re Bock, 280 N.Y. 349, 353, 21 N.E.2d
186, 187 (1939).
the parent has already voluntarily surren-
dered the child's custody and consented
to adoption. Where there has been no
change in the status of the relationship, i.e.,
no surrender or consent, it is presumed, in
all jurisdictions, that the natural parent's
custody of the child is in the child's best
interests.3 2
Although the absolute right approach
was once the rule in a majority of American
jurisdictions, 33  most jurisdictions have
adopted a more flexible approach to the
problem.34 Illustrative of this trend is the
approach of Minnesota. Once a firm ad-
herent to the rule of absolute revocation, 35
Minnesota has, by recent legislative enact-
ment, embraced the discretionary rule.30
The statute clearly states that
[a]fter a petition has been filed [for adop-
tion], the consent to the adoption may be
withdrawn only upon the order of the
court after written findings that such with-
drawal is for the best interest of the child. 37
Yet in spite of this trend, the absolute right
approach has not been abandoned. As
recently as 1966, the highest court of one
of the nation's most populous states-Penn-
32 People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue
Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 337, 85
N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
33 Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1038 (1942). It still is the
applicable rule in England, See Watson v. Nikolai-
sen, 2 Q.B. 286 (1955).
34 Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1011 (1945).
35 In re Baby Girl Larson, 252 Minn. 490, 91
N.W.2d 448 (1958); In re Adoption of Anderson,
189 Minn. 85, 248 N.W. 657 (1933); State ex rel.
Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435, 183 N.W.
956 (1921).
36 For authorities on the discretionary rule, see
Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1011 (1948).
37 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6) (1971).
sylvania-reaffirmed its adherence to the
rule. In In re Adoption of Hunter,3 s the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found it "well
settled . .. that a parent's consent to an
adoption may be withdrawn at any time
prior to the entry of a final decree of
adoption.39
However, some other jurisdictions which
adhere to this rule have attempted to limit
the time within which the absolute right
may be exercised, 40 in an obvious effort to
38 421 Pa. 287, 218 A.2d 764 (1966).
39 Id. at -, 218 A.2d at 767; see also In re
Adoption of Gunther, 416 Pa. 237, 206 A.2d 61
(1965).
40 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-11 (1966) provides:
Consent not revocable.-No consent described
in G.S. 48-6, 48-7, or 48-9, shall be revocable
by the consenting party after the entering of
an interlocutory decree or a final order of
adoption when entering of an interlocutory de-
cree has been waived in accordance with the
provisions of G.S. 48-21: Provided, no consent
shall be revocable after six months from the
date of the giving of the consent; provided
further, that when the consent has been given
generally to a director of public welfare or to
a duly licensed child placing agency, it shall
not be revocable after thirty days from the
date of the giving of the consent. When the
consent of any person or agency is required
under the provisions of this chapter, the filing
of such consent with the petition shall be
sufficient to make the consenting person or
agency a party of record to the proceeding;
and no service of any process need be made
upon such person or agency.
In re Adoption of Hoose, 243 N.C. 589, 91
S.E.2d 555 (1956) (consent may be revoked
within six months of its having been given) (dic-
tum). TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-117 (1971), a
more detailed statute, provides:
Revocation of surrender-form. No surrender
shall be revoked after the time herein provided.
No surrender shall be revoked after the enter-
ing of an interlocutory decree or a final order
of adoption when entering of an interlocutory
decree has been waived in accordance with the
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reduce the possible hardships upon all the
parties concerned. For instance, the state
of Hawaii allows the absolute right of revo-
cation to be exercised until the child is
provisions in this chapter. Provided a petition
to adopt has not been filed, any parent(s) who
has surrendered a child for adoption to a li-
censed child-placing agency or the state depart-
ment of public welfare shall have the absolute
right to revoke the surrender within thirty
(30) days from the date of the execution of
the surrender or within ninety (90) days from
the date of the execution of the surrender if
the surrender was executed to a person other
than a licensed child-placing agency or the
state department of public welfare by appear-
ing in chambers before the chancellor or cir-
cuit judge before whom the surrender was
executed, or his successor in office, and pre-
senting to him the original and two (2) copies
of the revocation of said surrender . . .
[statutory form] . . .
It shall be the duty of the court to attach
the original copy of the revocation of the
surrender to the original copy of the surrender
and to mail within three (3) days a copy of
the revocation to the state department of
public welfare, a copy to the licensed child-
placing agency or the person(s) to whom the
child was surrendered for adoption. If a pe-
tition to adopt has been filed prior to the
revocation of a surrender, the court in which
the petition to adopt has been filed shall have
jurisdiction to determine what is for the best
interest of the child. If a petition to adopt has
not been filed when the surrender is revoked,
the court before whom the surrender was exe-
cuted and revoked shall have jurisdiction to
determine what is for the best interest of the
child and to award the guardianship of the
child in conformity therewith. When a child
has been surrendered and the surrender is re-
voked prior to the filing of a petition to adopt,
the state department of public welfare, the
licensed child-placing agency or the person(s)
to whom the child was surrendered shall re-
turn the child to the natural parent(s) within
five (5) days after receipt of a copy of the
revocation or within five (5) days shall file a
verified petition in the court before whom the
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placed with the adoptive parents.-" Other
jurisdictions, apply the absolute right rule
to consents to individuals (as distinguished
from agency surrenders).42
surrender was executed and revoked to show
cause why it is not for the best interest of the
child to be returned to the parent(s), naming
the natural parent(s) party defendant(s).
When any person other than a licensed child-
placing agency or the department, as set out
above, files a petition to show cause why the
child should not be returned to the parent(s),
the petition must be filed in triplicate, the
original filed with the clerk of the court with
a copy sent to the state department of public
welfare and one (1) copy sent to the county
director of public welfare of the county in
which the petition is filed. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall order the county
director of the department of public welfare of
the county in which the petition is filed to
investigate the petitioner(s), the natural par-
ent(s) and any circumstances or conditions
which may have a bearing on what is for the
best interest of the child and of which the
court should have knowledge. The department
of public welfare shall report on all matters
set out by the court in the order of reference
within sixty (60) days upon receipt of a copy
of the petition. The report shall not be opened
to inspection by anyone except the court or on
an order of the court duly entered on the
minute book. The department of public welfare
shall have the right to intervene for the purpose
of introducing proof as to what is for the
best interest of the child. The court shall award
the guardianship of the child in accordance
with the child's best interest.
Both the North Carolina and the Tennessee stat-
utes, therefore, employ a combination of ap-
proaches.
41 Unlike statutes (note 40 supra) which rely on
time periods, the Hawaii law is concerned with
the happening of an event which might have sev-
eral implications.
Although the absolute right continues to exist,
once the child is placed with a view to adoption,
the revocation is at the discretion of the court.
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 331-2 (1955).
42 Compare, e.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 374 S.W.2d
In spite of these attempts at equitable
adjustments of the absolute right rule, the
937 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) and In re White's
Adoption, 300 Mich. 378, 1 N.W.2d 579 (1942)
(applying the absolute right rule to a consent to
an individual) with Catholic Charities v. Harper,
161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960) and Gon-
zales v. Toma, 330 Mich 35, 46 N.W.2d 453
(1951) (applying the irrevocable consent rule to
a surrender to an agency for adoption).
There has been some suggestion that New York
also recognizes a distinction between individual
and agency consents. A prominent author in
family law has stated that:
In New York the natural parent can revoke
consent to an independent placement until the
adoption has been judicially approved. Relin-
quishment to an agency is not irrevocable, but
the relinquishing parent has the burden of
proving it would be in the best interests to set
it aside. Compare In Re Adoption of Anony-
mous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 304 N.Y.S.2d 46
(1969), with Roe v. New York Foundling
Hospital, 33 A.D.2d 83, 305 N.Y.S.2d 276
(1969).
M. PAULSEN, W. WADLINGTON & J. GOEBEL,
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RE-
LATIONs 724 (1970) [hereinafter PAULSEN].
In People ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca Tal-
bot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, 271 App. Div. 672,
68 N.Y.S.2d 238 (2d Dep't 1947), the appellate
court noted the distinction between a surrender
to an individual and to an agency for adoption.
It pointed out that
[slurrender of custody of a child by a parent
to an individual as an incident of adoption by
the latter, whether or not by written instru-
ment, is without statutory cognizance.
Id. at 673, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 239 (inferring that
consent was still necessary for a later adoption).
It further stated:
In other words, save for the provision of the
. . . [Social Services Law § 383] . . . , the sur-
render agreement irrevocably transfers guard-
ianship and custody.
Id. at 674, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 240. See In re Anony-
mous, 60 Misc. 2d 854, 858, 304 N.Y.S.2d 46,
51 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1969):
The consent of a parent to adoption must be
an existing valid consent at the time of the
adoption.
noticeable trend in recent years, as in the
case of Minnesota, :  has been in the direc-
tion of the discretionary approach. 41 The
discretionary approach is now the rule in
a majority of jurisdictions. 45
The distinctions between the absolute
right and discretionary approaches are
pronounced. Under the discretionary rule,
the parent's right to revoke is sharply cur-
tailed. Unlike under the absolute right rule,
the mere exercise of the act of revocation
is in itself without legal consequence upon
the consent. Thus, the parent's act cannot
terminate the surrender or the consent.46
Thus, some courts in New York have considered
the agency surrender irrevocable. For instance,
Justice McGivern stated:
When an authorized agency is involved, the
utter finality of the surrender, barring fraud,
mistake, over-reaching or misrepresentation,
has become fixed in our law.
People ex rel. Skokas v. McCarthy, 7 Misc. 2d
963, 965, 164 N.Y.S.2d 198, 201 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1957). As authority for that statement,
Justice McGivern cited People ex rel. Harris v.
Commissioner of Welfare, 188 Misc. 919, 70
N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947),
which stated that "such a surrender doubtless
may be revoked for facts and upon grounds
which would reach a court to revoke any kind of
a contract." Id. at 922, 70 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
43 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6) (1971). For
a recitation of the statute, see note 36 and ac-
companying text supra.
44 Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1011 (1945).
45 Katz, supra note 22, at 88. As one commen-
tator has noted: "[a] survey of current law . . .
discloses that . . . revocation at the discretion of
the court, now has the most adherents." Legal
Doctrine at 564-65.
46 In fact, in several states if the parent per-
manently surrenders custody to an authorized
agency, the parent's consent is not necessary for
any adoption because the agency is considered
to have custody. Thus, the agency has the right
to consent to the adoption. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM.
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Furthermore, the purported revocation is
not considered to have the effect of depriv-
ing the court of the jurisdiction to act.47
In fact, it is only at the discretion of a
court of competent jurisdiction that the
parent's revocation acquires any legal ef-
fect.4 s Therefore, it is for the court to
decide whether or not the revocation is to
be allowed to occur. As the New York
Court of Appeals pointed out in People ex
rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption
Service, 9
The discretionary rule allows the court
leeway to approve revocation of the sur-
render when the facts of the individual case
warrant it .... 50
Thus, the courts which employ this ap-
proach do not react in Pavlovian fashion
REL. LAw § 111 (McKinney Supp. 1971); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.06 (Baldwin 1971).
47 Bailey v. Mars, 138 Conn. 593, 87 A.2d 388
(1952).
48 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(6)
(1971) (for the text of statute, see note 36 and
accompanying text supra); N.Y. Soc. SERVICES
LAW § 383(1) (McKinney 1966) provides:
The parent of a child remanded or committed
to an authorized agency shall not be entitled
to the custody thereof, except upon the consent
of the court, public board, commission, or
official responsible for the commitment of such
child, or in pursuance to an order of a court
or judicial officer of competent jurisdiction,
determining that the interest of such child will
be promoted thereby and that such parent is
fit, competent and able to duly maintain, sup-
port and educate the child. The name of such
child shall not be changed while in the custody
of an authorized agency.
49 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1971), aft'g 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317 N.Y.S.
2d 928 (1st Dep't 1971) (per curiam), aff'g No.
34102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Nov. 16, 1970).
50 Id. at 190, 269 N.E.2d at 790, 321 N.Y.S.2d at
69.
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to every parental attempt at revocation as
they would be bound to do under the
absolute right rule. Within the scope of
its discretion, the court is able to consider
the various factors present within the con-
fines of each individual set of circum-
stances. The inherent flexibility of this rule
allows the court to decide each case on the
basis of the factors it deems to be con-
trolling in the particular situation. Contrast-
ing it with the other approaches, the New
York Court of Appeals, in Scarpetta, re-
marked that the discretionary rule "avoids
the obvious dangers posed by the rigidity
of the extreme positions." 51 However, to
be an effective instrument of justice, the
discretionary power of a court must be
exercised within the framework of rational,
readily-identifiable criteria. Few can emu-
late Solomon.52
There is one more approach which must
be considered. In contradistinction to the
extent of parental power exerciseable under
the absolute right rule, some jurisdictions
attempt to preclude any parental challenge
to the act of consent.5 3 The consent is con-
sidered to be an irrevocable act on the part
of the parent.54 For instance, the Illinois
statute provides that
51 Id. (footnote omitted).
52 See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
53 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (Smith-
Hurd 1966); Skeen v. Marx, 105 So. 2d 517
(Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1958); Catholic Charities v.
Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960);
Gonzales v. Toma, 330 Mich. 35, 46 N.W.2d
453 (1951); Kozak v. Lutheran Children's Aid
Soc'y, 164 Ohio St. 335, 130 N.E.2d 796 (1955);
but see note 42 supra.
54 "[T]he release shall terminate the parental
rights permanently, beyond the power of the
[a] consent to adoption by a parent, includ-
ing a minor, executed and acknowledged
in accordance ... [with the Act] .. .or a
surrender of a child by a parent, including
a minor, to an agency for the purpose of
adoption shall be irrevocable. .... 55
Yet the shield of irrevocability is not im-
penetrable. The power of equity remains
available to prevent injustice by strict ad-
herence to the law. Thus, in these juris-
dictions, it is within the power of the courts,
either under equitable principles56 or under
statute,57to revoke the consent upon a show-
ing by the parent 58 that the consent was in-
duced by fraud, 9 duress, 60 misrepresenta-
parent to revoke." Gonzales v. Toma, 330 Mich.
35, 39, 46 N.W.2d 453, 455 (1951).
55 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (Smith-Hurd
1966). The Illinois Act applies to consents to
individual adoptions and surrenders to agencies.
56 People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner of Wel-
fare, 188 Misc. 919, 70 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1947) states that
[a] surrender doubtless may be revoked for facts
and upon grounds which would lead a court to
revoke any kind of a contract. . . . [citing
Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E.
764 (1923)].
In Zimmerman, the Court defined the term ir-
revocable contract as a contract which
cannot be revoked at the will of one party to
it, but can only be set aside for facts existing
at or before the time of its making which
would move a court of law or equity to revoke
any other contract or provision of a contract.
Id. at 20, 139 N.E. at 766.
57 E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (Smith-
Hurd 1966).
58 Petition of Simaner, 16 111. App. 2d 48, 147
N.E.2d 419, afl'd, 15 Ill. 2d 568, 155 N.E.2d 555
(1958). The burden of proving duress was on
the parent attempting to revoke. In re Adoption
of Arnold, 184 So. 2d 192 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966).
r,9 Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App. 2d 309, 207
N.E.2d 89 (1965).
60 Id. But see McGraffin v. Family & Children's
tion, mistake or overreachingOz The Illi-
nois statute, for example, continues that
the consent is irrevocable "unless it shall
have been obtained by fraud or duress and
a court of competent jurisdiction shall so
find. ' '63 However, the limitations on the
exercise of this power are precise. The
alleged misconduct must fall within one of
the delineated categories for a court to
interfere with the consent.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently ob-
served that
[m]ere advice, argument or persuasion is
not duress or undue influence if the in-
dividual acts freely when he executed the
questioned documents though the same
would not have been executed except for
the advice, argument or persuasion. 64
A Florida court has succinctly stated:
[s]uch documents should not be executed
without a full knowledge of their effect, nor
should a court permit such consents to be
set aside for frivolous or inconsequential
Serv., 7 App. Div. 2d 769, 179 N.Y.S.2d 948
(3d Dep't 1958) (mem.). The mother claimed to
have been coerced and induced by her husband
to surrender the child; the court held there could
be no return of the child because the agency was
not alleged to know of this, and because such
revocation should have been claimed promptly.
61 See, e.g., Cohen v. Janic, 57 Ill. App. 2d 309,
207 N.E.2d 89 (1965); Catholic Charities v.
Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960).
62 See, e.g., Catholic Charities v. Harper, 161
Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960). For a New
York case speaking in similar terms, see People
ex rel. Skokas v. McCarthy, 7 Misc. 2d 963, 164
N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957).
63 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-11 (Smith-Hurd
1966).
64 People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau,
34 111. 2d 84, 93, 213 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1966).
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reasons. Such consents should be respected
and abided by unless there is strong and
convincing proof that there was lack of
understanding of the import of the docu-
ment and that it was not the intent of the
parents to permanently permit their child
to be adopted by others.65
Thus, within the scope of the irrevocable
consent rule, if the characterization of the
misconduct does not fit the well delineated
boundaries set out by the courts, the con-
sent will be considered irevocable. If there
is no normative basis for the courts to act,
they are without discretion.
As was the case with the absolute right
rule, the irrevocable consent approach has
been criticized on the ground that harsh
results often occur because of its rigidity.66
This criticism has been especially strong in
cases where the surrendering mother is an
unwed mother. One commentator offered
this astute observation:
At the time her child is born the unwed
mother is usually emotionally distraught:
Also, unwed mothers are often seriously
neurotic and have difficulty making deci-
sions based on realistic considerations. This
mother is particularly vulnerable to efforts,
well-meaning or unscrupulous, to persuade
her to signed consent. Such consents may
be executed under circumstances not
amounting to legal fraud or duress; but
their truly voluntary nature may be ques-
tioned.67
Thus, once again it is the inflexibility of
65 In re Adoption of Arnold, 184 So. 2d 192,
194 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1966).
60 People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin
Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787,
321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
67 Legal Doctrine at 570 [The footnotes which
cited sociological treatises are omitted].
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the rule which subjects innocent parties to
harsh results.
It would seem that the most effective
approach in any attempt to achieve an equi-
table result in each case would be the
discretionary rule. The rigid formulas
dictated by the other two approaches were
often the occasion for hardship and in-
equitable results in individual cases. The
absolute right rule can cause uncertainty
and insecurity in prospective adoptive par-
ents, while the irrevocable consent rule can
preclude an innocent parent from his right-
ful claim to custody because the circum-
stances of his case do not qualify under
the limited exceptions permitted by the
rule.6" A rule whereby the courts can
assess each situation individually consti-
tutes a more viable alternative. Among the
approaches, only the discretionary rule pre-
sents any hope for equitable consideration
of the interests of all concerned-natural
parent, adoptive parents, child and society.
Although this approach is not without
fault, its advantages outweigh its disad-
vantages. A closer examination of this ap-
proach will facilitate a better understanding
of it within the judicial context.
In order for the discretionary approach
to be effective, it is necessary for the courts
applying it to establish a standard. Two
divergent sets of criteria have been utilized
as directional standards.
In the earlier cases, the courts employing
the discretionary approach often grounded
their decisions in terms of a parental right
test.69 The nature of the test may be in-
68 See note 67 supra.
69 E.g., Bradley v. Bennett, 168 Ala. 240, 53
ferred from its name. Under this test, the
court emphasized the primary natural right
of the biological parent to custody of the
child.70 In Bradley v. Bennett,71 the Ala-
bama Supreme Court set forth the precise
formula:
"When an infant child or minor is out of
the possession and custody of the father,
and habeas corpus is resorted to by the
latter to obtain such custody, it does not
follow as a matter of right that the prayer
of the petitioner will be granted. The court
is clothed with a sound discretion to grant
or refuse relief, always to be exercised for
the benefit of the infant primarily, but not
arbitrarily, in disregard of the father's
natural right to be preferred. If the father
be reasonably suitable and able to maintain
and rear his child, his prayer should be
granted. If, on the other hand, he be
unsuitable or unable properly to care for
his offspring, the court should grant no
relief in the premises, but leave the parties
in statu quo."'7 2
It will be noted, however, that unlike the
absolute right rule, this parental right test
involved only a presumption on the part of
the court. It was not an uncompromising
standard. As the Bradley court stated, the
presumption "should not be allowed to
overturn weightier considerations. ' 73 It was
So. 262 (1910) (courts quoted parental right
test but held against natural parent); Kirkbridge v.
Harvey, 139 Ala. 231, 35 So. 848 (1904). See
People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539,
104 N.E.2d 895 (1952); In re Jewish Child Care
Ass'n, 5 N.Y.2d 222, 156 N.E.2d 700, 183
N.Y.S.2d 65 (1959) (superior right of agency
over foster parents to custody; dissent argued
that the child's interests should be primary).
70 Id.
71 168 Ala. 240, 53 So. 262 (1910).
72 Id. at 241, 53 So. at 263.
73 Id.
rebuttable by an affirmative showing of the
unfitness of the natural parent-, seeking to
revoke the transfer of custody. Thus, al-
though the natural parent brought the
habeas corpus proceeding, 75 the burden of
coming forward with proof of parental
unfitness fell upon the party attempting to
retain custody under the surrender and
consent to adoption.76 While this test in-
volves a presumption in favor of the natural
parent as a procedural device, its effect
upon the discretionary rule can be substan-
tive in nature. 77 Under this test, the pre-
sumption may prove to be impossible to
rebut. If the parent is not shown to be
unfit, the presumption of the parent's right
is controlling. 78 Thus, only the surrenders
and consents of unfit natural parents would,
74 See In re Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E.
630 (1925). There, the Court stated:
Her right as a parent . . . to the care and
custody of the child becomes superior to that
of all others unless it should be shown anew
by the child's relatives or custodians that she
is an unfit person to exercise such guardian-
ship.
Id. at 449-50, 148 N.E. at 631-32. See generally
People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465,
113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
75 Habeas corpus is a proper remedy to deter-
mine custody between parent and non-parent.
Id. at 467, 113 N.E.2d at 803.
76 See People ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous,
10 N.Y.S.2d 332, 179 N.E.2d 200, 222 N.Y.S.2d
945 (1961). In this case the court emphasized
that the presumed parental right to the child fails
when the parent is shown to be unfit. See gen-
erally Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 Colo. 454, 111 P. 21
(1910). The court develops at length the natural
rights of the parent to custody and the limitations
on the power of the state to subordinate those
rights.
77 See, e.g., People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-
Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269
N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971).
78 Id.
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in effect, be held valid by a court employing
this presumption. The use of this test would
cause as much uncertainty and insecurity
among prospective adoptive parents as the
absolute right rule. Since it does not in-
volve some of the more important and
relevant considerations and interests, the
scope of the test, as a basis for the exercise
of discretion, is too narrow for effective
utilization of the discretionary power.
The second version of the discretionary
approach, which developed later, is the so-
called best interests test. The criterion of
this test is simply the best interests of the
child. Yet this simple definition has caused
some consternation among judges.
What is for the best interests of this child?
In answering such a question judges feel
their inadequacy. . . . The first considera-
tion is the well being of the child . . . But
are there no other criteria?79
There are other criteria. In spite of its
simple definition, the test involves the
analysis of the complex and intricate set
of factors and interrelationships which sur-
round each individual child. Though the
test is simple to define, discerning a child's
best interests is not a simple matter. Com-
pared to the confined limitations of the
parental right test, the best interest test
provides a broad scope of inquiry-all in-
formational data relevant to the well being
of the child. The weight of this data has
been deemed by various courts to be con-
trolling. As a New York court observed,
[i]t is now too well settled to require forti-
79 Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 399-400,
190 P.2d 426, 432-33 (1948).
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fication by extended citation from cases
that, in determining to whom the custody
of an infant of tender years shall be con-
fided, the paramount and controlling con-
sideration is the welfare of the infant. To
this all other considerations must be sub-
ordinated including the wishes of the par-
ents. . . . Of course a father or a mother
has a strong natural claim to the custody
and companionship of a child, but even
this must give way where it clearly appears
that the child's welfare requires a different
disposition of its custody.8 0
As a test, it simply provides a standard
against which the circumstances of a given
situation may be measured. The standard
is the child's well-being-physical and
psychological. Yet in weighing the factors"'
affecting the child's best interests, the rele-
vant factors have no order of importance
within the scheme of the best interests test.
The child's physical and psychological en-
vironment8 2 and its relative stability as a
80 In re Meyer, 156 App. Div. 174, 176, 141
N.Y.S. 123, 124 (1st Dep't 1913). See generally
People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285,
2 N.E.2d 660 (1936).
8t The factors may include the physical, psycho-
logical and mental development of the child.
For a general discussion of such factors, see
E. HURLOCK, CHILD DEVELOPMENT (4th ed.
1964) and A. JERSILD, CHILD PSYCHOLOGY (5th
ed. 1960).
82 Id.
The New York Court of Appeals has noted:
The surroundings and associations of the young
have so great an effect upon their outlook and
so form the basis of their future development
that nothing should prevent the courts from
considering the human aspects of the question
presented.
In re Bock, 280 N.Y. 349, 353, 21 N.E.2d 186
(1939).
The controlling principle in all cases being the
welfare of the child which . . . involves proper
care and nurture, suitable environment, health-
context for his development must be
weighed heavily in any consideration of his
interests.
One court attempted to set forth the
relevant criteria:
Among other pertinent factors which must
be considered are the age of the child; the
periods of time the child has spent with his
natural parents, at the institution and with
his foster parents; the effects, if any, of
removing the infant from the agency or his
foster home; and the affection, economic
and psychological well-being and the cul-
tural advantages which the infant can
reasonably anticipate from the foster par-
ents.83
Thus, the court must view the totality of
the child's existence-the complex of inter-
relationships and dependencies which de-
velop-and make a decision as to which
factors are to be weighed most heavily in
each situation.8 4 The measure of the factors
ful surroundings, and education, mentally and
morally.
In re Gustow, 220 N.Y. 373, 376, 115 N.E. 995
(1917). See generally Wilson v. Mitchell, 48
Colo. 454, 111 P. 21 (1910).
83 People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue
Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 338, 85
N.Y.S.2d 541, 546 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949)
(Justice Botein).
84 Id. The court continued that
[a]n evaluation of only the above mentioned
factors in the proceeding tilts the scale heavily
on the side of the prospective adoptive parents.
Id. at 338, 85 N.Y.S.2d at 546.
Another New York court stated:
In the circumstances and considering the pres-
ent home life being afforded the infant by the
prospective adoptive parents, the Trial Justice
decided that the best interests of the child
would not be promoted by return to his
mother.
Roe v. New York Foundling Hosp., 33 App. Div.
against the ever present standard will fluc-
tuate on the basis of the facts of each case.
With all the tools of modern medicine and
contemporary psychological methodology,
the test, as a criterion for the exercise of
discretion, provides an effective means for
assessing an individual situation and con-
siders the single most important interest
within the framework of the situation-the
child. Some courts in viewing this pro-
cedure consider it too elongated. The courts
employ a procedural short-cut. While not
abandoning the best interests test, these
courts impress upon every set of circum-
stances a presumption that the custody of
the child in the biological parent is in the
best interests of the child. 8 5 While this may
be true while the child is still in his parent's
custody, a different situation arises "[o]nce
the custody of the natural parent is ter-
minated, this presumptive significance
loses a great deal of its vigor."8 6 Yet the
courts, in order to lighten their task, have
applied this presumption even to cases
where the parent terminated his custody
and later seeks to regain custody. 7 While
2d 83, 84, 305 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (1st Dep't
1969) (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.2d
533, 261 N.E.2d 111, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (1970).
85 Root v. Allen, 377 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1962);
Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 86 A.2d 463 (1952);
Jackson v. Jackson, 164 Kan. 391, 190 P.2d 426
(1948).
86 People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue
Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 337, 85
N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949)
(When the natural parent has custody, the pre-
sumption of parental right must be overcome);
but see People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305
N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
87 People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y.
465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953), citing People ex
rel. Portnoy v. Strassen, 303 N.Y. 539, 104
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courts employing this procedural presump-
tion still claim to be acting in the child's
best interests, they are, in effect, applying
the parental rights tests. Their inquiry is
no longer objective. The presumption, by
procedurally shifting the burden, affects
the substantive rules. This presumption
dilutes the realm of objective inquiry and
places the burden on the adoptive parents.
Thus, as with the parental right test and the
absolute right rule, this presumption of
best interests adversely affects the adoptive
system-agencies and prospective adoptive
parents. Prospective adoptive parents may
become wary of becoming involved in
costly litigation and the possibility of heart-
break-losing a child they have come to
love and consider as their own.
Recently, the New York Court of Ap-
peals employed such a presumption. 8 In
People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin
Adoption Service,89 the natural mother was
seeking to regain the custody of her child
after she had surrendered it, pursuant to
statute,90 to an authorized agency for adop-
N.E.2d 895 (1952) (involving a mother who had
never terminated her custody).
88 See Foster, Revocation of Consent to Adop-
tion: A Covenant Running with the Child, 166
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1971, at 4, col. 1 (very critical
cf the Court of Appeals).
89 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.
2d 65 (1971). For recent discussion, see Com-
ment, The Adoption of Baby Lenore: Two Inter-
pretations of a Child's Best Interests, 11 J. FAM.
L. 285 (1971).
DO N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW § 384 (McKinney
1966). The mother executed a written instrument
to the agency wherein she stated:
Finding that I am unable to provide a suitable
home for said child and feeling that the wel-
fare of the child will be promoted by its adop-
ADOPTIVE PARENT V. NATURAL PARENT
tion. The child had been placed with
prospective adoptive parentsf 1
tion or by its being placed in foster care, the
undersigned . . . voluntarily, unconditionally
and absolutely surrender, transfer and commit
said child to the custody, control, care and
management of the Spence Chapin Adoption
Service . . . with the understanding that said
child may be adopted by person or persons as
said agency in its discretion may select . . .
Record on Appeal at 57.
91 The child was born on May 18, 1970. The
mother voluntarily surrendered her to the agency
on May 22, 1970 for foster care. On June 1, the
mother executed a formal surrender, with a
present consent to any future adoption. On June
18, the child was placed with foster parents; on
June 23, the mother asked for the child's return.
It was not until November 16, 1970 that the su-
preme court ordered the child returned to the
mother. People ex rel. Scarpetta v. Spence Chapin
Adoption Service, No. 34102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County, Nov. 16, 1970). The child remained with
the adoptive parents until the appeal ended on
April 7, 1971.
After the Court of Appeals decision, the pro-
spective adoptive parents left the jurisdiction
and fled to Florida with the child. The mother
followed them and brought an action in the
Florida courts to regain the custody of her child
from the adoptive parents pursuant to the decree
of the New York court. The Florida trial court,
however, refused to be bound by that decision
and found that it was in the best interests of the
child that she remain with the prospective adop-
tive parents. The Florida District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, affirmed the lower court
findings. It concluded that the New York decision
was not entitled to full faith and credit, but only
to great weight under comity (citing authorities).
Scarpetta v. DeMartino, No. 745 (Sept. 28,
1971).
The determination by the Florida court that
the New York custody decrees were not entitled
to full faith and credit is supported by the au-
thorities. Full faith and credit only requires a
sister state give the decree the same effect as to
finality as the sister state would give. Since
custody decrees are generally amendable, courts
have concluded that they are not entitled to full
The lower court reasoned that
[t]he issue here is not whether the petitioner
can rescind the surrender of her child, but
whether the child's best interests are served
by its return to its natural mother . . .
rather than with prospective adoptive par-
ents. 9
2
This court determined that the placement
of the child with adoptive parents was
rather hasty; that the mother had acted
quickly and consistently,93 motivated solely
by her concern for the well-being of her
child,94 and that the natural mother was a
fit parent. Upon these findings, it ordered
the child returned to the natural mother.95
faith and credit under the Constitution. See
Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to
Child Custody Decrees?, 73 YALE L.J. 134, 138
(1963); Comment, Conflicting Custody Decrees:
In Whose Best Interests? 7 DUQ. L REV. 262
(1968-1969). Later, in denying a rehearing, the
Florida appeals court stated that since the child
had remained with the adoptive parents through-
out the proceedings in New York with the
mother's approval, a change of circumstances had
occurred, i.e., the development of a strong rela-
tionship between the child and adoptive parents.
No. 745 (Nov. 30, 1971). Accord, People ex rel.
Wessell v. New York Foundling Hosp., 34 App.
Div. 2d 947, 312 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Ist Dep't 1970)
(mem.) (subsequent marriage of unwed mother
considered a change of circumstances).
92 No. 34102 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Nov. 16,
1970).
93 Id. The court cited other cases where the
factual circumstances of the time element or the
consistency of the mother's claim were detri-
mental to her claim of custody. Id., citing People
ex rel. Doe v. Edwards, 31 App. Div. 2d 64, 295
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1968), afJ'd ,nem., 23
N.Y.2d 925, 246 N.E.2d 358, 298 N.Y.S.2d
508 (1969).
9 No. 34102 (Sup. Ci. N.Y. County Nov. 16,
1970).
95 Id. The court also mentioned that appeals
The appellate division unanimously af-
firmed the decision.96 The Court of Appeals
in such a case has limited review of ques-
tions of law.97 However, instead of merely
affirming the findings, the court engaged in
a protracted discussion9 8 of the area of
revocation of surrender and consent. After
acknowledging the discretionary power of
the New York courts to order a change of
custody99 even after a permanent surrender
of custody, the court proceeded to formu-
late a test whereby the best interests of the
child could be determined. Although the
natural mother in the case had offerd
evidence why the child should have been
returned to her, 100 the Court of Appeals
deemed it necessary to establish a pre-
sumption. It held that the natural parent's
right to be
so important "that in determining the best
should be handled quickly to avoid any further
hardships to the parties.
96 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1st
Dep't 1971) (mem.).
In so doing the court held, interestingly, that
"[t]his disposition must be confined in its effect
to the case immediately before us."
The court said she acted quickly to regain
custody
by applying to respondent agency, offering to
demonstrate, as she did later at Special Term,
"that the interest of such child will be pro-
moted thereby, and that such parent is fit,
competent and able to duly maintain, support
and educate such child."
Id.
97 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (findings of fact af-
firmed by appellate division in civil matters are
binding).
.98 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1971).
99 N.Y. Soc. SE1RVICES LAW § 383(I) (McKin-
ney 1966).
100 36 App. Div. 2d 524, 317 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1st
Dep't 1971) (mem.).
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interests of the child, it may counterbal-
ance, even outweigh, superior material and
cultural advantages which may be afforded
by adoptive parents. . . . For experience
teaches that a mother's love is one factor
which will endure, possibly endure after
other material advantages and emotional
attachments may have proven transient.' 10 1
The court added that
the primacy of status thus accorded the
natural parent is not materially altered or
diminished by the mere fact of surrender
under the statute, although it is a factor to
be considered by the court.
Finally, the court concluded that
to give the fundamental principle meaning
and vitality, we have explicitly declared that
"[e]xcept where a nonparent has obtained
legal and permanent custody of a child by
adoption, guardianship or otherwise, he
who takes or withholds a child from mother
or father must sustain the burden of estab-
lishing that the parent is unfit and that the
child's welfare compels awarding its cus-
tody to the nonparent."' 0 2
The court also discussed what it would
consider to be sufficient unfitness or im-
proper motivation seeking the return of
the child to rebut the presumption of par-
ental custody as the child's best interests.
As authority for its establishment of a pre-
sumption, the court cited a case' 0 3 which
dealt with a private placement of a child
for adoption104 and not the surrender to an
101 28 N.Y.2d at 192, 269 N.E.2d at 791, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 70.
102 Id. at 192-93, 269 N.E.2d at 971-92, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 71.
J03 People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y.
465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953).
104 For the distinction between private and
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agency. Although a mother must consent to
an adoption after a private placement, 10 5
in an agency surrender the statute'0 6 pro-
vides for the agency's consent and not the
parent's. An agency surrender can only be
undone pursuant to statute.'0 7 The statute
provides that the surrender may be undone
by the court in the interests of the child
and if the parent is fit.' 0 It establishes no
presumptions. In fact, although there is a
means provided for a surrender to become
irrevocable, 109 as to all who had notice,
the same statute provides that lack of such
judicial approval does not invalidate a
agency placements for adoption, see note 10
supra. But see this statement of the New York
Court of Appeals in the Scarpetta case:
[N]or do we perceive any distinction, in prin-
ciple, between the effect of a surrender to an
authorized agency or of a surrender to an in-
dividual.
28 N.Y.2d at 193, 269 N.E.2d at 791, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 71.
105 See note 42 supra.
106 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
107 N.Y. Soc. SERVICE LAW § 383(1) provides:
The parent of a child remanded or committed
to an authorized agency shall not be entitled
to the custody thereof, except upon consent
of the court, public board, commission, or
official responsible for the commitment of
such child, or in pursuance of an order of a
court or judicial officer of competent jurisdic-
tion, determining that the interest of such child
will be promoted thereby and that such parent
is fit, competent and able to duly maintain,
support and educate such child. The name of
such child shall not be changed while in the
custody of an authorized agency.
But see People ex rel. Anonymous v. Rebecca
Talbot Perkins Adoption Soc'y, 271 App. Div.
672, 673, 68 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (2d Dep't 1947)
(statute does not mention private surrender).
108 N.Y. Soc. SERVICE LAW § 383(1) (McKin-
ney 1966).
109 Id. § 384(4) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
written surrender. 110 In interpreting the
surrender statute, other New York courts
have placed the burden of proof of defeat-
ing the surrender upon the mother. 1' The
Appellate Division, First Department, has
stated that sections 383 and 384 of the
Social Services Law,
read together, declare that a parent who
commits her child to an authorized agency
by a voluntary, duly executed and acknowl-
edged surrender instrument "shall not be
entitled to the custody" of the child except
on court order "determining that the best
interest of the child will be promoted
thereby and that the parent is fit, compe-
tent and able to duly maintain, support and
educate such child."" 2
110 Id.
311 People ex rel. Doe v. Edwards, 31 App. Div.
2d 64, 295 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1st Dep't 1968)
afl'd inem., 23 N.Y.2d 925, 246 N.E.2d 358, 298
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969); Roe v. New York Foundl-
ing Hosp., 33 App. Div. 2d 83, 305 N.Y.S.2d
276 (1st Dep't 1969), appeal dismissed, 27 N.Y.
2d 533, 261 N.E.2d 111, 312 N.Y.S.2d 1002
(1970); Roe v. New York Foundling Hosp., 36
App. Div. 2d 100, 318 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1st Dep't
1971).
112 People ex rel. Doe v. Edwards, 31 App. Div.
2d 64, 65, 295 N.Y.S.2d 531, 532 (1968).
This language was quoted in the per curiam
opinion by the Court of Appeals affirming the
decision. 23 N.Y.2d 925, 246 N.E.2d 358, 298
N.Y.S.2d 508 (1969).
In fact, in this case the Court of Appeals had
more leeway because the appellate division had
reversed a lower court finding that the best
interests of the child would be served by returning
the child to the natural mother.
As the appellate division pointed out:
The deed was done. It cannot be undone unless
judicial scrutiny can find coercion.... or that
the best interests of the child dictate a return.
31 App. Div. 2d at 65, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 532-33.
Other New York courts have spoken of the sur-
render in even stronger terms. See note 42 supra.
As an earlier New York court noted,
it is not revocable at the will or upon the
mere whim or caprice of the parent or
merely because the parent has experienced
a change of mind or heart. 113
The statute is clear. The best interests
of the child are to prevail. There is no
statutory presumption of parental custody
in the child's best interests where a parent
has surrendered the child.' 1 4 It is a crea-
ture of a strained judicial statutory inter-
pretation. It in many respects defeats the
primary purpose of the best interest test.
Obviously, an unfit parent or a parent with
improper motives is incapable of maintain-
ing the presumption in his favor. This is not
the purpose of the law or the intent of the
Legislature. The New York Court of Ap-
peals has effectively emasculated the statu-
tory test.115
Not all jurisdictions applying a best
interests test under the discretionary rule
follow the New York approach. For in-
stance, Massachusetts'" places the burden
upon the natural parent seeking to revoke
the surrender and consent. In a recent case,
113 People ex rel. Harris v. Commissioner of
Welfare, 188 Misc. 919, 922, 70 N.Y.S.2d 389,
393 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
This court also noted that the six month resi-
dency requirement before adoption was not a
reference to a time within which the surrendering
parent could revoke the surrender. But see In re
Burke, 60 N.Y.S.2d 421 (Sur. Ct. 1946).
114 People ex rel. Grament v. Free Synagogue
Child Adoption Comm., 194 Misc. 332, 85
N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1947).
115 N.Y. Soc. SERVsCaS LAW § 383(1) (McKin-
ney 1970).
116 In re Revocation of Appointment of Guard-
ian, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 621 (1971).
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the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts has pointed out that in their jurisdic-
tion "the mother has .. the heavy burden
of showing that she is entitled to set aside
her consent.""'
Movements have begun in New York to
legislatively modify the Court of Appeals
ruling,118 but these attempts have not been
117 Id. at -, 271 N.E.2d at 625.
118 Both houses of the New York Legislature
passed a bill which would have altered the effect
of the decision, but it was vetoed by the Gov-
ernor.
The Governor outlined the effect of the bill
in his veto message:
The bill would establish a period during which
a natural parent would have the absolute right
to revoke an agreement surrendering a child
to an authorized adoption agency or to with-
draw consent to a private placement. In cases
of an agency adoption the period would ter-
minate 30 days after surrender or upon place-
ment with an adoptive family, whichever is
later. Subsequent to that period the only
grounds for reversing that surrender would be
fraud, duress or coercion. In a private place-
ment the period would run until 30 days after
notice to the natural parent of commencement
of judicial proceedings to make the placement
permanent. The voluntariness and providency
of the consent would be reviewable by the
court upon, the appearance of the natural
parent.
Veto Message of the Governor-A. 4225-C
Memorandum No. 213 (July 6, 1971).
The Governor noted that there is now no
absolute right to revoke in cases of authorized
agency surrender. He stated his reasons for
vetoing in these terms:
[Despite efforts] to minimize potentially harm-
ful changes of custody . . . I am persuaded the
bill would unduly limit the discretion of courts
to consider all aspects of a situation in deter-
mining and protecting a child's best interests.
On the one hand, the 30 day limit could
foreshorten the opporlunity for a distraught
parent to change his or her mind in the cool
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successful."" The Scarpetta parental cus-
tody presumption is becoming ingrained in
light of day; on the other hand, the absolute
right for 30 days could upset long-standing
placements-in each case to the detriment of
the child's best interests-and the court would
be powerless to protect those interests fully.
Id.
However, in May, 1972 Governor Rockefeller
signed into law an altered version of the same
bill. The new law specifically rejected the natural
parent presumption created by the Court of Ap-
peals, stating that in using the best interests test
to determine custody ". . . there shall be no pre-
sumption that such interests will be promoted by
any particular custodial disposition."
The new law continues that:
no action or proceeding may be maintained
by the surrendering parent or guardian for the
custody of the surrendered child or to revoke
or annul such surrender where the child has
been placed in the home of adoptive parents
and more than thirty days have elapsed since
the execution of the surrender or where the
purpose of such action or proceeding is to re-
turn the child to or vest the child's custody in
any person other than the parent or guardian
who originally executed such surrender. This
subdivision shall not bar actions or proceedings
brought on the ground of fraud, duress or
coercion in the execution or inducement of a
surrender.
L. 1972, ch. 639, at 1233-34, eff. May 30, 1972,
amending N.Y. Soc. Services Law § 383 (McKin-
ney 1966).
For a discussion of relevant social considera-
tions, see Katz, Community Decision-Makers and
the Promotion of Values in the Adoption of
Children, 4 J. FAM. L. 7 (1964).
The Scarpetta case also refused to allow the
prospective parents the right to intervene. 28
N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d 787, 321 N.Y.S. 2d 65
(1971).
The Legislature also passed a bill, signed into
law by the Governor, which overruled the court
on this point. Prospective adoptive parents may
now intervene as interested parties in any attempt
to revoke a surrender by a natural parent. L. 1971,
ch. 1142, at 2157, eff. Sept. 1, 1971, amending
N.Y. Soc. SERVICEs LAW § 384 (McKinney 1966).
119 Id.
our law.' 20 The other factors in individual
cases must be properly weighed if the dis-
cretionary rule is truly going to function in
the best interests of the child. The presump-
tion is in fact an obstacle to the best
interests test. A recent New Jersey case 121
though acknowledging the natural right of
the parent to custody, has stated unequivo-
cally that other factors may greatly out-
weigh the right. The court accepted the
testimony of child-experts on the possible
problems which the transfer of custody
might have upon the child. 12 2 Obviously,
the court considered the possible "trau-
matic shock a very young child can experi-
ence when separated from the only mother
it has ever known, and handed over to ...
the natural mother, with whom it has had
no real identification.' 12' The court quoted
a note 124 on this problem:
After a period of separation from the bio-
logical parent and care by a third party,
the child may learn to look upon the latter
as his biological parent; any prior relation-
ship with the biological parent may deterio-
rate to the point where it is not only sup-
planted but also incapable of resuscitation.
Where this has happened, the change in
custody based solely on biological relation-
ship might, by disrupting the existing rela-
tionship of psychological parenthood, work
considerable emotional harm upon the
child.1 25
120 See, e.g., Musso v. McAlpine, 36 App. Div.
2d 901, 321 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1st Dep't 1971).
121 In re Adoption of Child P, 114 N.J. Super.
584, 277 A.2d 566 (App. Div. Super. Ct. 1971).
122 Id. at -, 277 A.2d at 571.
123 Id.
124 Note, Alternatives to 'Parental Right' in
Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties,
73 YALE L.J. 152, 158 (1963).
125 114 N.J. Super. 584, 277 A.2d 566, 571-72.
The search for a child's best interests
should be the concern of the courts; there
is no reason to employ harsh presumptions
-often to the detriment of the child.
After considering these tests and their
relative impact upon the exercise of judicial
discretion, it becomes obvious that the
paramount concern should be the best
interests of the child. He is the one most
affected by any disposition. It is he alone
who may suffer the irreparable injury of
transfer. The court should be able to decide
from an objective review of the situation
what the needs of the child are within any
situation. The solution to the problem of
the New York presumption is not revocable
or irrevocable periods of time but the re-
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turn of the discretionary power to the
court free from the bondage of presump-
tions. Solomon's answer was not a healthy
solution, but it was an effective means by
which to uncover the child's best interests.
Modern courts, aided by psychologists and
doctors, should be able to readily discover
such interests. Whatever the natural right
of the parent prior to termination of cus-
tody, upon termination of custody in favor
of an individual or an agency the gauntlet
is passed to the state to protect its helpless
citizens. As of yet the best method for the
child's protection is for the courts to act in
his best interests. It is in this way that the
natural rights of the child will be most
likely to prevail.
